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Abstract. Privacy is recognised as a fundamental requirement for eHealth
systems. Proposals to achieve privacy have been put forth in literature,
most of which approach patient privacy as either an access control or an
authentication problem. In this paper, we investigate privacy in eHealth
as a communication problem, since future eHealth systems will be highly
distributed and require interoperability of many sub-systems. In addi-
tion, we research privacy needs for others than patients. In our study,
we identify two key privacy challenges in eHealth: enforced privacy and
privacy in the presence of others. We believe that these privacy chal-
lenges are vital for secure eHealth systems, and more research is needed
to understand these challenges. We propose to use formal techniques to
understand and define these new privacy notions in a precise and unam-
biguous manner, and to build an efficient verification framework.
1 Introduction
The inefficiency of traditional paper-based health-care and the development of
information communication technologies, in particular cloud computing, mobile,
and satellite communications, give electronic health-care (eHealth for short) a
great opportunity to grow as an important part of people’s daily life. eHealth
systems aim to provide effective support for secure sharing of information and
resources across different health-care settings, and workflows among different
health-care providers. The services of such systems for the general public are
intended to be more secure, more effective, more efficient, more patient-centered
and more timely. However, the attractive advantages of eHealth systems entail
many scientific challenges. One of the foremost of these are the privacy issues
raised by adapting electronic storage and communication, due to the sensitive
nature of health data. Indeed, privacy in eHealth has been recognised as one of
the paramount requirements necessary for adoption by the general public [1, 2].
Moreover, existing privacy experience from domains such as electronic voting
(e.g., [3]) and online auctions (e.g., [4]) does not carry over straightforwardly. In
voting and auctions, there is a natural division into two types of roles: partici-
pants (voters, bidders) and authorities (who run the election/auction). eHealth
systems have to deal with a far more complex constellation of roles: doctors,
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patients, pharmacists, insurance companies, medical administration, etc. Each
of these roles has access to different private information and different privacy
concerns. As existing privacy approaches from other domains are not properly
equipped to handle such a diverse array of roles, privacy must be tailored to the
health-care domain.
Various proposals to achieve privacy in eHealth have been put forth in the lit-
erature. Most focus on patient privacy (notable exceptions: [5–7]) and approach
that as an access control or authentication problem. The virtually exclusive focus
on patient privacy in the literature has left the question of privacy requirements
of other parties, doctors in particular, wide open. The fact that some parties,
e.g., pharmacists, cannot be fully trusted adversely impacts privacy [6].
Furthermore, eHealth systems must provide assurance of privacy and address
privacy issues at different system levels – architectural design, access control,
communication protocols, etc. Making the issue more complex is the sensitive
nature of health-care data, which is subject to regulations, guidelines and appli-
cation of professional ethics. Currently, (patient) privacy is usually described in
terms of protection of information and in terms of controlling access to services.
Thus, it is commonly achieved in practice by means of a form of access control
or authentication (e.g., see [8–12]). However, typical eHealth systems, especially
in future, will be highly distributed and require interoperability of many sub-
systems. Even if health-care data is well protected and access control is perfectly
employed, improperly designed communication protocols for such interoperabil-
ity will cause information leakage and hence breach users’ privacy. So far, security
and privacy of communication protocols in eHealth systems is seldom studied in
the literature. This implies that related privacy notions, emerging in other fields,
do not yet have a counterpart in the eHealth domain. A prime example is the
notion of coercing vs. enforced privacy: in voting, a voter is coerced to reveal how
she voted (to sell her vote). For eHealth systems, a similar case would be a phar-
maceutical company bribing a doctor to reveal which medicine he prescribed.
Given the current state of eHealth research, we find that enabling privacy is
well-studied. However, there is a lack of attention for enforcing privacy.
Contributions. Our main contribution is to identify two new types of enforcing
privacy as key privacy challenges for the field: enforced privacy (e.g., a doctor
cannot prove to a pharmaceutical company which medicine he prescribed) and
privacy in the presence of others (e.g., a patient cannot reveal which doctor
prescribed her medicine). We propose to use formal techniques to address these
challenges, that is: to understand and interpret these new privacy notions in a
precise and unambiguous manner, and to build an efficient verification framework
for analysing privacy properties of eHealth systems.
Outline of the paper. We briefly survey existing approaches to privacy in
eHealth in Section 2, finding a lack of attention to enforced privacy. Next, Sec-
tion 3 identifies what we argue to be two main challenges for privacy in eHealth.
In the remainder of the paper, we outline the need for a formal approach in ad-
dressing these challenges (Section 4), and report briefly on our ongoing analysis
of an eHealth protocol claiming to be privacy-preserving (Section 5).
2 A brief survey of privacy in eHealth
Privacy in eHealth systems has attracted much research effort and a variety of
different privacy-enabling methods have been proposed. This section provides
a brief overview1 of previous work on privacy in eHealth. We divide previous
work in two categories, focusing on patient privacy (Section 2.1) and on doctor
privacy (Section 2.2), respectively.
2.1 Enabling patient privacy
The importance of patient privacy in eHealth is traditionally seen as vital to es-
tablishing a good doctor-patient relationship. This is even more pertinent with
the emergence of the Electronic Patient Record [8]. As in most of the literature,
a necessary early stage of eHealth is to transform the paper-based health-care
process into a digital process. The most important changes in this stage are
made to patient information processing, mainly health-care records. To properly
express privacy requirements for such patient records, privacy policies are con-
sidered the de facto standard. There are three main approaches to implement
these requirements of patient privacy: access control, architectural design, and
the use of cryptography.
Patient privacy by access control. To preserve privacy of electronic health-
care records, one necessary part is to limit access to these records to allowed
parties. Anderson [8] lists several privacy threats to personal health informa-
tion as support for his claim that privacy policies for access control should be
mandatory in eHealth systems. Anderson [8] proposes access rules to restrict
the number of users who can access any record and the maximum number of
records accessed by any user. In a case study [9], Louwerse argues that consent-
based access rules (e.g., a patient approving use of his data for research) are
required in addition to rules based on the “need-to-know” principle. Evered
and Bo¨geholz [11] investigate minimal-disclosure access constraints for a small
eHealth system, and find that even for a small system, constraints cannot be
expressed easily or clearly using static access rules. As a solution, they propose
adding a middle layer of logic, which translates constraints into access rules. Reid
et al. [10] adapt role-based access control (RBAC) to include explicit consent and
denial. Explicit denial is to grant access to a role (e.g., doctors), but deny access
to a particular individual (excluding a particular doctor); explicit consent is the
converse property: granting access for individuals while denying access to the
role. Kalam et al. claim also investigate shortcomings of classical access con-
trol models (such as RBAC and task based authorisation controls (TBAC) [13],
1 This literature overview is not intended to be exhaustive.
etc.), and find these are insufficient to capture security policies that need to be
context-aware (e.g., to grant emergency access to a patient record), that specify
onligations or recommendations. They propose a new access control model Or-
BAC [14] (organisation based access control), designed to be particularly suited
for eHealth access control. The access rules of eHealth systems are complex, and
may become inconsistent – one rule may contradict another. Cuppens et al. [15]
propose assigning priorities to rules and show that this can resolve such problems
in rule-based access control and in OrBAC.
Patient privacy by architectural design. As stated in the introduction,
eHealth systems cater to a number of different roles, including doctors, pa-
tients, pharmacists, insurers, etc. Each such role has its own sub-systems or
components. As such, eHealth systems can be considered as a large network of
systems, including administrative system components, laboratory information
systems, radiology information systems, pharmacy information systems, and fi-
nancial management systems. Diligent architectural design is an essential step
to make such a complex system function correctly. Since privacy is important
in eHealth systems, keeping privacy in mind when designing the architecture of
such systems is a promising path towards ensuring privacy [16]. Ko et al. [17]
discuss privacy issues when building wireless sensor networks for eHealth. Some
eHealth system architectures are specially designed with a particular privacy is-
sue in mind, e.g., Maglogiannis et al. [18] propose an architecture that enhances
patient location privacy by communication via proxies, which can learn location
but not patient identity. There also exist architectures which use different pri-
vacy protecting techniques at different layers of a system. For example, Chiu et
al. [19] study privacy requirements for cross-institution image protection and de-
sign a system that uses access control rules, RBAC, and watermarking at various
levels to offer secure and privacy-aware, cross-institutional image sharing.
Cryptographic approaches to patient privacy. Cryptography is a neces-
sary tool for privacy in eHealth systems [20]. For example, Van der Haak et
al. [21] use digital signatures and public-key authentication (for access control)
to satisfy legal requirements for cross-institutional exchange of electronic pa-
tient records. Ateniese et al. [22] use pseudonyms to preserve patient anonymity,
and enable a user to transform statements concerning one of his pseudonyms
into statements concerning one of his other pseudonyms (e.g., transforming a
prescription for the pseudonym used with his doctor to a prescription for the
pseudonym used with the pharmacy). Layouni et al. [23] consider communication
between health monitoring equipment at a patient’s home and the health-care
center. They propose a protocol using wallet-based credentials (a cryptographic
primitive) to let patients control when and how much identifying information
is revealed by the monitoring equipment. More recently, De Decker et al. [7]
propose a health-care system for communication between insurance companies
and administrative bodies as well as patients, doctors and pharmacists. Their
system relies on various cryptographic primitives to ensure privacy, including
zero-knowledge proofs, signed proofs of knowledge (a signature scheme which
uses zero-knowledge proofs to sign a message), and bit-commitments. Their sys-
tem is explained in more detail in Section 5.
2.2 Ensuring doctor privacy
A relatively understudied privacy aspect is that of doctor privacy. Matya´sˇ [5]
investigates the problem of enabling analysis of prescription information while
ensuring doctor privacy. His approach is to group doctors, and release the data
per group, hiding who is in the group. He does not motivate a need for doctor
privacy, however. Two primary reasons for doctor privacy have been identified
in the literature: (1) (Ateniese et al. [22]) to safeguard doctors against admin-
istrators setting specific efficiency metrics on their performance (e.g., requiring
the cheapest medicine be used, irrespective of the patient’s needs). To address
this, Ateniese et al. [6, 22] propose an anyonymous prescription system that uses
group signatures for privacy; (2) (De Decker et al. [7]) to prevent a pharmaceuti-
cal company from bribing a doctor to prescribe their medicine. De Decker et al.
also note that preserving doctor privacy is not sufficient to prevent bribery: phar-
macists could act as go-betweens, revealing the doctor’s identity to the briber.
They propose a privacy-preserving health-care scheme that incorporates the roles
of pharmacist and health insurer as well as doctor and patient.
2.3 Observations
In the above overview, we observe that current approaches to privacy in eHealth
mostly focus on patient privacy and try to solve it as an access control or au-
thentication problem. However, eHealth systems involve many different roles,
and these roles have their own privacy concerns. We believe that doctor privacy
is as important as patient privacy and should be studied in more depth to avoid
situations such as doctor bribery (cf. Section 2.2). In addition, we consider that
one party’s privacy may depend on another party (e.g., in the case of a pharma-
cist revealing prescription behaviour of a doctor). Our opinion is that offering
privacy is insufficient if privacy can be reduced in such ways.
It is clear from the analysis that privacy in eHealth systems needs to be ad-
dressed at different layers: use of cryptography guarantees privacy at the foun-
dation layer; access control ensures privacy at the service layer; privacy by de-
sign addresses privacy concerns at the system/architecture layer. Since eHealth
systems are complex [24] and rely on correct communications between many
sub-systems, we strongly advocate to study privacy in eHealth as a communica-
tion problem. In fact, message exchanges in communication protocols may leak
information which leads to a privacy breach.
Privacy properties such as anonymity, unlinkability, untraceability etc. have
been studied in the literature. All these notions play a role in eHealth systems
and each provides a different strength of privacy that can be enabled. However,
enabling privacy is far from enough. In many cases, a system must enforce user
privacy instead of allowing the user to pursue it. Enforced privacy has been
considered in other domains. Below, we briefly sketch highlights in development
of the notion of enforced privacy from other domains.
Enforced privacy in other domains. In the literature, the notion of enforced
privacy was studied first in electronic voting. Benaloh and Tuinstra [25] intro-
duce the notion of receipt-freeness, which expresses that a voter cannot gain any
information to prove to a vote-buyer how she voted. This notion preserves voter-
privacy even when a voter actively seeks to renounce that privacy, as in the case
of vote-buying. Another, stronger notion of privacy is coercion-resistance [26],
stating that a voter cannot cooperate with the intruder to prove how she voted.
Both notions of privacy actually capture the essential idea that privacy must be
enforced by a system upon its users, instead of merely offering it.
Enforced privacy has been studied outside voting. For instance, a few pa-
pers [27, 28] have identified a need for receipt-freeness in online auctions. In
eHealth, however, enforced privacy has received to date little attention.
3 Key privacy challenges
Considering how the notion of enforced privacy applies to the eHealth domain
leads us to identify two key privacy challenges for the domain:
– enforced privacy, e.g., a doctor cannot prove to a pharmaceutical company
which medicine he prescribed; and
– privacy in the presence of others, e.g., a patient cannot help a doctor to
prove he prescribed her medicine.
Satisfying these privacy notions is not easily in any setting. However, the added
complexity of the eHealth domain (where a “break-the-glass” requirement exists
to ensure emergency access to records) makes these formidable challenges.
3.1 Challenge I: enforced privacy
Enforced privacy plays an important role in eHealth systems, especially for doc-
tors. A typical scenario can be described as follows. A pharmaceutical company
seeks to persuade a doctor to favor a certain kind of medicine by bribing or
coercing. To prevent this, a doctor should not be able to prove which medicine
he is prescribing to this company (in general, to an adversary). This implies
that doctor privacy must be enforced by eHealth systems. Generally speaking, a
doctor should not be able to prove what he prescribed to any third party except
for trusted authorities.
Enforced privacy in eHealth is hardly studied. As such, a proper understand-
ing (beyond the anecdotal scenario given above) of the importance of enforced
privacy is absent. Therefore, it is important to investigate which roles in eHealth
systems require the notion of enforced privacy. It is also interesting to study
which cryptographic techniques can be employed to enforce privacy. Develop-
ment of systems providing enforced privacy will benefit from privacy-enforcing
techniques used in other domains. These include techniques to guarantee receipt-
freeness and coercion-resistance, for example chameleon bit commitments as used
in a receipt-free online auction protocol [27].
To tackle this challenge, we propose to first focus on lifting formal definitions
of enforced privacy to the eHealth domain, and secondly to develop efficient tech-
niques to verify enforced privacy in eHealth. Due to the complexity of eHealth
systems, all these remain as scientific challenges.
3.2 Challenge II: privacy in the presence of others
The notion of enforced privacy emerged in voting systems and online auction
protocols. In these domains, privacy requirements are mainly focused on the
central role (voter and bidder, respectively). In stark contrast, eHealth systems
involve many different, non-central roles. Some of these roles have access to
sensitive information which reveals something about the privacy of another role.
For example, a pharmacist has access to prescriptions, and thus knows something
about the prescription behaviour of a doctor. Such a party may be bribed or
coerced to help break the other party’s privacy. Literature [5, 7, 22] underlines
the need to protect a doctor’s prescription pattern. This means that no one,
except for the doctor himself or trusted third parties, must be able to link the
doctor to his prescriptions. In order to obtain a doctor’s prescription pattern, an
adversary can bribe other parties to reveal their private information which lets
the adversary determine a doctor’s prescription. This leads us to formulate the
requirement of third-party-independent doctor privacy : no third party should
be able to help the adversary link a doctor to his prescription. On the other
hand, these third parties can also help to protect a coerced user. We therefore
distinguish two cases:
– coalition-enforced privacy (CE-PRIV): a third party helping to protect the
coerced user’s privacy; and
– third-party-independent privacy (TP-INDEP): a third party helping the the
adversary to break a user’s privacy.
In the first case, the third party cooperates with the coerced user to protect the
coerced user’s privacy, and reveals his secret information to the coerced user if
necessary – forming a coalition, which enables the coerced user to hide from the
adversary. For example, a patient cooperates with a bribed doctor to lie about
which medicine the doctor prescribed. In the second case, the third party reveals
(whether by choice or coercion) his private information to the adversary, enabling
the adversary to breach the other user’s privacy. For example, a pharmacist can
help to breach doctor privacy, by revealing the doctor’s prescription behaviour
to a pharmaceutical company. In some cases (such as the example), the doctor’s
privacy is breached without involving the doctor.
We emphasise that TP-INDEP is different from enforced privacy: in enforced
privacy, the revealing party breaches her own privacy, while in TP-INDEP, she
helps breach another’s privacy.
CE-PRIV and TP-INDEP are new notions of privacy, which have not been
studied in the literature. In our view, these privacy notions are important for
eHealth systems, and stand on their own as privacy challenges.
4 The need for a formal approach
We believe that to solve the two key challenges in a generic fashion, an improved
understanding of the concepts enforced privacy and privacy in the presence of
others is necessary. Moreover, we feel that an evaluation method is necessary to
validate that a proposed solution indeed addresses these challenges. We argue
that neither understanding nor evaluation framework can be properly addressed
without formal methods.
In the literature, many research efforts have been devoted to ensure enforced
privacy properties for electronic voting. However, despite the best intentions
(e.g., [25, 29]), receipts have time and again been found (e.g., [30, 31]). This
propose-attack cycle underlines the need for formal methods, which are mathe-
matically based techniques to specify and verify systems.
This is especially pertinent in the eHealth domain, where enforced privacy
is a new concept. Moreover, in the eHealth domain, privacy has focused on
access control and system design – but even under the assumption of perfect
cryptography, communications may reveal private information (cf. the above
mentioned attacks). Finding such attacks manually is error-prone, and can give
no assurances of completeness. On the other hand, formal verification can give
some assurances. Since the eHealth domain stands to benefit so strongly from
employing formal methods to express and evaluate security requirements, we
fiercely advocate its use.
Current formal approaches to enforced privacy. In voting, several for-
malisations of enforced privacy properties have been proposed. Delaune et al. [3]
develop their formalisation of receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance based on
observational equivalences in the applied pi calculus [32]. Automatic verifica-
tion techniques within the applied pi calculus framework have been proposed by
Backes et al. [33]. Their approach focuses on remote electronic voting protocols,
and mainly deals with coercion-resistance. Baskar et al. [34] define a language
to specify voting protocols and use an epistemic logic to reason about receipt-
freeness. Although it is relatively easy to express privacy properties based on
logic of knowledge, it is rather difficult to develop verification techniques within
such a logical framework. Jonker et al. [35] introduce a formal framework com-
bining knowledge reasoning and trace equivalences to model and reason about
receipt-freeness for voting protocols and provided a quantitative definition of
voter-controlled privacy. Based on the work of Delaune et al. [3], Dong et al. [4]
formalise receipt-freeness in online auction.
The use of process theory has led to success in voting, and the possibility of
lifting this to other domains has been shown. However, an eHealth system has a
large diversity in roles, something not seen in voting systems or auction systems.
As such, a direct applications of formalisms developed elsewhere to eHealth can
only approximate the subtleties of (coalition-)enforced privacy in eHealth. It is
still a challenge to formally define and verify privacy, enforced privacy, privacy
in the presence of other in eHealth.
5 Towards formalising enforced privacy
A case study. Currently, we are investigating2 privacy of the DLV08 proto-
col [7]. The protocol involves five main roles: patient, doctor, pharmacist, medical
prescription administration (MPA), and insurance company. It works as follows:
first, a patient communicates with the doctor to get a prescription. The patient
then communicates with the pharmacist to receive the medication prescribed.
Next, the pharmacist communicates with the MPA for a refund. The MPA sends
an invoice to the patient’s insurance company, and once this is paid, the MPA
pays the pharmacist.
We model each role’s behaviour as a process in applied pi. Thus, the protocol
is modelled as the parallelisation of all these processes3: Pdr | Ppt | Pph | Pmpa |
Phii . The DLV08 protocol claims (amongst others) doctor-enforced privacy (a
doctor cannot prove what he prescribed), and third-party-enforced doctor pri-
vacy (third parties cannot help the adversary to reveal the doctor’s prescrip-
tion pattern). To check these claims, we formalise doctor-enforced privacy and
third-party-independent doctor privacy as observational equivalences and verify
whether DLV08 satisfies either using the automatic verification tool ProVerif [36].
To illustrate how we approach the formalisation, we sketch our formalisation
of doctor-enforced privacy. Intuitively, doctor-enforced privacy means that the
adversary cannot distinguish between a doctor prescribing a and claiming to have
prescribed a, and a doctor prescribing b while claiming to have prescribed a. We
model this roughly as Pdr (a, a) ≈ Pdr ′(b, a), where ≈ denotes observational
equivalence. Note that the doctor is lying in the second case, thus he behaves
differently – hence we do not write Pdr (b, a). Naturally, we do not check this in
isolation, but in the presence of all other parties, i.e., we verify whether Pdr (a, a) |
Ppt | Pph | Pmpa | Phii ≈ Pdr ′(b, a) | Ppt | Pph | Pmpa | Phii .
Future directions. Existing formalisations (in voting) of enforced privacy us-
ing observational equivalence [3] provide voters with a fixed defensive strategy.
This approach implies that the coerced voter is teamed up with another voter,
such that one of their two cast votes matches the adversary’s wishes. Privacy is
preserved if the adversary cannot determine which of them cast his vote. This
forming of defensive coalitions4 was introduced as a modelling trick to ensure
observational equivalence between an execution where a coerced voter complies
2 For the latest developments, see http://satoss.uni.lu/projects/epriv/.
3 We omit some details, such as multiple instances of processes, here.
4 Receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance in [3] match our notion of CE-PRIV.
with the coercer and one where she does not. In general, we envisage more ap-
plications for coalition-forming in the formal understanding of enforced privacy.
On one hand, different parties may form larger coalitions and so have a more
robust defensive model. On the other hand, as noted in Challenge II, privacy
with respect to an adversary conspiring with multiple parties is inherently lower
than the privacy with respect to an adversary without such a coalition or with
a smaller coalition. This leads to a variety in behaviour, which is not easily ex-
pressed in process theory, but naturally captured in game theory. Hence, game
theoretic approaches towards enforced privacy may be promising. In particular,
the work of Ku¨sters et al. [37], a game theoretic definition of coercion-resistance
in voting, might be adapted towards this end.
Assurance of privacy properties via formal verification is an important step
in developing eHealth systems. However, automatic verification of observational
equivalences is in general undecidable5 . Recently, research has been devoted to
decision procedures for observational equivalences by focusing on a fragment of
the applied pi calculus [38]. It is interesting to investigate the applicability of
this research to aid verification of privacy properties in eHealth.
6 Conclusion
eHealth systems are drawing attention because of their potential advantages.
However, due to several challenges, the widespread adoption of eHealth systems
is still at an early stage. One of the key challenges is to understand privacy issues
in eHealth. Current study on this topic mainly focuses on patient privacy and
solves it as an access control problem. Privacy issues of other involved parties
and during communications are rarely studied so far. We advocated the position
that in addition to enabling privacy in eHealth (such as protecting patient pri-
vacy), enforcing privacy plays a critical role, especially for doctors. In addition,
we identified another privacy requirement, privacy in the presence of others, and
argued that a proper understanding requires formalisation, as does genuine veri-
fication of these properties. Finally, we sketched our ongoing study of the DLV08
protocol, which claims to enforce privacy for the doctor.
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